Trump’s second term has fundamentally reshuffled EU–US relations. Tariffs, Ukraine, NATO and European defense autonomy — here is what European leaders are doing and what their citizens think.
In early 2025, the Trump administration announced sweeping tariffs on EU goods — a baseline 10% on all imports, with sectoral tariffs targeting steel (25%), aluminum (25%) and automobiles (25%). The EU’s reaction was swift and unified.
The European Commission prepared retaliatory measures targeting approximately $28 billion in US goods — a carefully calibrated list designed to inflict political pain in Trump-supporting US states. Products targeted included Harley-Davidson motorcycles, Kentucky bourbon and Florida orange juice.
| EU Country | Oppose US Tariffs | Main Export at Risk |
|---|---|---|
| Germany | 71% | Automobiles (BMW, VW, Mercedes) |
| France | 68% | Wine, luxury goods, aerospace |
| Italy | 62% | Food products, industrial machinery |
| Netherlands | 66% | Chemicals, pharmaceuticals |
| Poland | 58% | Steel, manufactured goods |
| Hungary | 41% | Automotive parts (most Trump-friendly EU country) |
Trump’s signals of reduced US commitment to Ukraine forced a fundamental strategic rethink in European capitals. Rather than waiting for Washington, EU governments accelerated their own defense commitments.
President Macron raised the prospect of extending France’s nuclear deterrent to EU partners, a historic shift. He also proposed deploying European troops to Ukraine as peacekeepers. 54% of French support deeper EU military engagement.
Germany’s new government under Friedrich Merz approved a €100 billion+ special fund for military and security spending — a constitutional revision. 57% of Germans support increased defense spending (a historic high).
Poland is building the largest army in continental Europe, targeting 4% of GDP for defense. As Ukraine’s direct neighbor, Polish public opinion strongly backs Western support: 74% support continued Ukraine aid.
Orbán’s Hungary remains the sole EU member aligned with Trump’s framing on Ukraine. Hungary has blocked several EU aid packages. Only 31% of Hungarians support EU military aid to Ukraine.
Trump’s insistence that European NATO members “pay their share” has accelerated a debate that predates his presidency: should Europe build a defense capability independent of US leadership?
The EU’s ReArm Europe plan, unveiled in 2025, committed to mobilizing up to €800 billion for defense over four years. Multiple EU countries — Germany, Poland, Sweden, the Baltic states — announced defense budgets above 3% of GDP.
A key question: can EU defense replace US security guarantees? Most analysts say no in the short term — the US provides irreplaceable nuclear deterrence, intelligence sharing and logistical capacity. But the direction of travel has shifted permanently.
| Country | Leader | Trump Relations | Trump Trust (Public) | Key Stance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Germany | Merz (CDU) | Tense | 18% | Strong Ukraine support, EU defense push, resists tariffs |
| France | Macron (Renew) | Adversarial | 19% | Nuclear umbrella proposal, EU sovereignty push, bilateral outreach |
| Poland | Tusk (KO) | Mixed | 34% | Wants US troops to stay, supports Ukraine, pro-NATO spending |
| Hungary | Orbán (Fidesz) | Warm | 52% | Aligns with Trump on Ukraine, immigration; blocks EU unity |
| Italy | Meloni (FdI) | Pragmatic | 29% | Personal rapport with Trump; navigating between EU loyalty and US ties |
| Denmark | Frederiksen (S) | Very Tense | 17% | Greenland threats have shocked Danish public; defense spending surge |
A Pew Research Center survey (Spring 2025) across 14 European countries found overwhelming distrust of Trump’s foreign policy judgment:
| Country | Trust Trump in World Affairs | Change vs. Biden Approval |
|---|---|---|
| Germany | 18% | −59 pts |
| France | 19% | −57 pts |
| Sweden | 21% | −54 pts |
| Netherlands | 24% | −51 pts |
| Spain | 20% | −56 pts |
| Poland | 34% | −40 pts |
| Italy | 29% | −46 pts |
| Hungary | 52% | +5 pts (Fidesz base) |
| EU average | 22% | −55 pts |