| Sector | EU Exports to US (est.) | US Tariff Applied | Impact Level |
|---|---|---|---|
| Automotive & Parts | €51B | 25% (prior) + 20% | Critical |
| Machinery & Equipment | €95B | 20% | High |
| Pharmaceuticals | €73B | Exempt (initially) | Moderate / Threatened |
| Chemicals | €42B | 20% | High |
| Steel & Aluminium | €8B | 25% (since March 2025) | High |
| Food & Beverages | €22B | 20% + existing | Moderate |
| Airbus Aircraft | €15B | Suspended (Boeing deal) | Low (truce) |
Source: European Commission DG Trade, 2025. Estimates based on 2023–2024 bilateral trade flows. Pharma exempt status subject to ongoing review by US USTR.
The transatlantic trade relationship entered its most turbulent phase since the 1970s steel disputes when the Trump administration re-imposed 25% tariffs on EU steel and aluminium in early 2025, terminating the arrangement negotiated by the Biden administration. The “Liberation Day” tariff announcement in April 2025 escalated further, applying a 20% baseline tariff to all EU goods — framing the EU’s €158 billion goods trade surplus with the US as evidence of “unfair” trade practices. The US side pointed specifically to EU value-added tax (VAT) systems, product standards, and regulatory barriers as non-tariff measures that disadvantage American exporters. The EU rejects this characterisation, arguing that VAT is a domestic consumption tax applied equally to domestic and foreign goods.
The European Commission’s response was calibrated to apply maximum political pressure in US swing states without triggering full escalation. The €95 billion retaliation list targeted bourbon whiskey (Kentucky/Tennessee), Harley-Davidson motorcycles (Wisconsin), pork products (Iowa), and agricultural machinery from battleground congressional districts. The Commission’s calculation was that these exports have sufficient political salience to incentivise Congressional pressure on the White House to negotiate. At the same time, the EU held back full implementation of the retaliation, offering a “zero-for-zero” tariff elimination proposal on industrial goods — the framework that both sides had discussed but never finalised under the 2019–2020 TTIP/sectoral negotiation round.
The EU also activated, for the first time, its Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI) — a regulation passed in 2023 specifically to give Brussels tools to respond to economic coercion by third countries. The ACI allows the Commission to impose trade restrictions, procurement exclusions, and investment limitations on a country deemed to be coercing an EU member state or the EU itself. Invoking it against the US is legally and diplomatically unprecedented and signals how seriously Brussels is treating the tariff escalation. WTO dispute filings were launched in parallel, though WTO proceedings take years and the appellate body remains paralysed by US blocking of judicial appointments.
| Question (Eurobarometer, 2025) | Agree | Disagree |
|---|---|---|
| EU should respond with counter-tariffs on US goods | 61% | 22% |
| US tariffs on EU exports are unfair | 73% | 14% |
| EU should prioritise negotiation over retaliation | 55% | 31% |
| US tariffs will harm my household (cost of living) | 58% | 26% |
| Approve of US tariff policy overall | 27% | 60% |
Source: Eurobarometer Flash, April 2025. EU-27 weighted averages. Figures pre-date any potential negotiated resolution.
EU offers mutual zero tariffs on industrial goods. Discussed since 2019. Trump team sceptical. Would cover ~60% of bilateral goods trade if agreed — the most consequential trade deal in a generation.
EU offering to increase US LNG purchases (replacing Russian gas) and buy more US defence equipment. Seen as a package deal to reduce the bilateral trade deficit and give Trump a political win.
WTO filings and the Anti-Coercion Instrument keep legal pressure on while negotiations proceed. ACI activation is a first; its use against the US is legally and diplomatically unprecedented.