Executive Power: DOGE, Courts & Constitutional Lines

The Department of Government Efficiency entered government as an advisory committee but has operated with access and influence that blurs the line between advising and directing. DOGE teams have accessed Treasury payment systems, USAID contractor databases, Social Security Administration data and other federal systems without the typical appropriations, Senate confirmation or civil service oversight processes. Courts have issued multiple orders restricting DOGE's data access and blocking specific contract cancellations, finding that the administration exceeded its authority to unilaterally terminate congressionally-appropriated spending.

The claimed savings figure — $180 billion or more depending on the accounting — has been disputed by the Government Accountability Office and independent budget analysts, who note that DOGE's tracking system includes double-counted, already-expired and judicially-restored spending. The real policy question is not the number but the mechanism: whether a presidentially-appointed advisory body can effectively direct federal agency operations in ways that displace Senate-confirmed agency heads and bypass congressional appropriations.

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) — the statutory basis for most of the 2026 tariffs — was designed for use in genuine international emergencies, not as a routine trade policy tool. The Trump administration's use of IEEPA to impose sweeping tariffs on all trading partners, including close allies, represents a significant expansion of how the law has historically been applied. Federal courts in the First Circuit and Court of International Trade have questioned whether the tariff applications meet the statutory requirements; the cases are on expedited review. If courts limit IEEPA's application, the tariff regime could require congressional authorization — which does not currently exist.

The impoundment battle represents an even more direct constitutional confrontation. The Impoundment Control Act of 1974 — passed with bipartisan supermajorities in response to Nixon-era abuses — explicitly prohibits the executive branch from refusing to spend funds Congress has appropriated. The administration's position that this Act is unconstitutional would, if accepted by courts, fundamentally shift the balance of power over federal spending from Congress to the President. The Supreme Court's pending review is expected to produce a landmark separation of powers ruling with consequences extending well beyond the current administration.