Sweden: NATO Member, Far-Right Kingmakers & the Migration Backlash

Sweden's September 2022 general election produced a razor-thin victory for the right-wing bloc over the incumbent Social Democrats led by Magdalena Andersson. Ulf Kristersson of the Moderate Party became Prime Minister, heading a minority coalition of the Moderates, Sweden Democrats-aligned Liberals, and the Christian Democrats. The Sweden Democrats (SD) — the nationalist far-right party under Jimmie Åkesson — do not hold ministerial posts but provide the parliamentary majority the government needs to pass legislation in exchange for policy concessions on immigration, crime, and integration. This arrangement, known informally as the "Tidö Agreement," was controversial when formed: the Social Democrats and other center-left parties had long refused to engage with SD, and the explicit inclusion of SD as a support party crossed a longstanding political taboo.

SD is now Sweden's second-largest party, polling at around 20%. The party's rise — from political pariah to parliamentary kingmaker in under two decades — is directly linked to Sweden's 2015 migration crisis. In that year alone, Sweden received approximately 163,000 asylum applications, the highest per capita in the European Union. The social and political consequences shaped a decade of subsequent politics: pressure on housing, schools, and integration services fed a backlash that SD exploited consistently and effectively. Gang violence in Swedish cities — disproportionately linked to second-generation immigrant communities in media and political discourse — became the central domestic issue of the 2022 campaign, and SD's hard line on crime and deportation resonated with a segment of the electorate that had previously voted Social Democrat.

The defining foreign policy development of Sweden's current political era is NATO accession. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shattered Swedish security assumptions built over two centuries. Public support for NATO membership swung rapidly from minority to majority position within weeks of the invasion. Sweden applied alongside Finland and, after navigating objections from Turkey and Hungary, officially joined NATO on March 7, 2024. The accession ended Sweden's policy of military non-alignment dating to 1814 — a transformation that would have been politically unthinkable two years earlier. Sweden now hosts a growing NATO presence and has significantly increased defense spending.

Sweden joined the European Union in 1995, in the same enlargement round as Austria and Finland. It is a member of the Schengen area but has retained the Swedish Krona rather than adopting the Euro — a choice ratified by referendum in 2003 and not seriously revisited since. Sweden holds 21 seats in the European Parliament, where its MEPs sit across several groups. Swedish politics does not neatly map onto EU-wide left-right cleavages: the Moderates are in the EPP, the Social Democrats in S&D, while SD sits with the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR).

Sweden has historically been among the EU's most committed supporters of open trade, rule-of-law conditionality, and development aid. The Kristersson government has maintained Sweden's EU commitments while shifting domestic policy rightward on immigration. The NATO accession means Sweden is now fully integrated into the Western security architecture for the first time, reinforcing its role as a significant contributor to EU defense and Baltic Sea security. Sweden is particularly relevant to the EU's eastern flank, given its proximity to the Baltic states and Finland. The government's willingness to increase defense spending from 1.3% to above 2% of GDP fulfills a longstanding NATO commitment and strengthens Sweden's credibility as a security partner.

Sweden's relationship with the Trump administration is shaped primarily by its brand-new NATO membership and its status as a major defense and technology exporter. Sweden joined NATO in March 2024, and the Kristersson government has been eager to demonstrate its value as a new ally. Sweden contributes to NATO's eastern flank defense, has increased defense spending toward 2% of GDP, and hosts key NATO exercises in the Baltic Sea region. On this dimension, Sweden's relationship with Washington is productive: a new member eager to prove its commitment aligns with Trump's demand that European allies pay more for their own defense.

On trade and the EU's broader confrontation with Trump's tariff agenda, Sweden's position is more complex. Sweden is a highly export-oriented economy with significant US market exposure — particularly in defense technology (Saab/Gripen), telecoms (Ericsson), and manufacturing. The Kristersson government has supported the EU's collective trade response while quietly seeking to protect Swedish-specific export interests. On China, Sweden has been hawkish for years — expelling Chinese ambassador Gui Minhai case drew years of bilateral tension — aligning with Trump's confrontational posture toward Beijing. Sweden's combination of new NATO enthusiasm, defense spending increases, and anti-China stance gives it more common ground with the Trump administration than many EU member states, despite its liberal domestic politics.

The Sweden Democrats have achieved something unusual even by the standards of Europe's far-right surge: they have become a permanent structural feature of Swedish governance without ever sitting in a cabinet. SD won 20.5% in the 2022 election — its best-ever result — and the Tidö Agreement formalized the party's role as the government's external support pillar in exchange for hard-line immigration and crime policies. This arrangement means that SD's priorities — drastically reduced asylum acceptance, faster deportations, stricter sentencing — have been implemented as government policy while the party retains the political advantage of not owning the government's failures. It is a strategically sophisticated position: SD exercises governing power with limited governing accountability.

Heading into the September 2026 election, SD polls at 20–22% and shows no signs of significant decline. The party's core issue — immigration and integration failure — remains salient: gang violence, linked in public discourse to failed integration of 2015-era arrivals, is still Sweden's top domestic concern. SD under Åkesson has used the governing period to further normalize its public image: more parliamentary procedures, less inflammatory rhetoric, more policy-focused. The trajectory mirrors what happened in Denmark, where the Danish People's Party used a similar external support arrangement in the 2000s and 2010s to pull Danish immigration policy sharply rightward while mainstream parties governed. SD appears positioned to remain at 18–22% regardless of which bloc governs after 2026.